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This is Chapter 6 from:  
Newton, D.P. (2012) Teaching for Understanding, Routledge, London. 
 
6 Something to think with 
 
 
Overview 
 
Not everything has to be, or can be, carried in the head. Often, it is possible to give 
learners something which behaves a little like a memo or notepad. This chapter looks at 
some examples. In addition, analogies can be powerful devices for supporting productive 
thought. Thinking with the help of analogies is a natural process that even young children 
can handle, given certain conditions. In spite of this, many teachers ignore or neglect 
them. For this reason, analogies receive particular attention in this chapter. Various kinds 
of analogy and their uses are described. Although they are valuable possessions, their 
limitations must also be recognized. 
 
 
Representations 
 
Sometimes, what must be understood is demanding for the learner. It may, for example, 
take too much of the available mental resource to process, it may be too abstract or it may 
call for other knowledge and understanding which, at present, is beyond the reach of the 
learner. In short, the learner fails to build a working model – an internal representation – 
of what is to be understood in his or her head. But this does not mean understanding is 
impossible. We can often help learners by giving them something to think with. This 
something – an external representation – captures the essence of what is to be understood. 
It could, for instance, be something as simple as a gesture or movement or it could be a 
picture, a diagram or a chart. For example, very young children can interpret and use 
simple gestures to communicate and grasp thoughts (Trepanier-Street 2000). The human 
body can also be used as an aid to understanding with older children, as when we help 
them grasp the short amount of time that Homo sapiens has existed using someone with 
an outstretched arm. If the distance from the nose to the finger tip stands for one billion 
years, it would take more than four such people to show the age of the Earth but only a 
thin shaving of skin on the finger tip of one of them represents the duration of our 
existence (Law 2003). Such representations are devices which enable the learner to see 
relationships more readily and make reasoning easier. The graphic organizer is an 
example of such devices. 
 
 
Graphic organizers 
 
The graphic organizer is a scaffold in the form of a picture, diagram or chart which guides 
the learner’s thought. Pictures have been seen as worth a thousand words for centuries 
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and have been used to support classroom learning for a long time. Although not the first, 
Comenius’ Orbis sensualium pictus (The World in Pictures) was particularly well-known 
and went through over a hundred editions over several centuries (Newton, D. 1990). 
Pictures, especially when simplified to emphasize relevant information, can provide a 
ready-organized mental model for the learner to manipulate. For example, 4, 5 and 6-
year-olds heard a story about How Rosie Rabbit Almost Looked Over the Hedge. This was 
a tale about a rabbit whose field was cluttered with the farmer’s rubbish. The initial 
arrangement of the objects and the subsequent action which involved their re-arrangement 
were described. If the child did not adequately represent the initial situation in working 
memory, a relevant updating of it would be unlikely as the action progressed. In short, 
such children would not understand the subsequent action of the story. This was found to 
be the case for the overwhelming majority of those tested. However, when another group 
was shown a picture of the initial situation briefly at the beginning of the story, the 
overwhelming majority of these children were able to demonstrate an understanding of 
the subsequent action through to the end of the story. Having a clear, well-founded mental 
representation of the starting point of an event is likely to support appropriate updating or 
manipulation of that representation subsequently (Newton, D. 1994b). Describing how 
brakes worked for older learners, Mayer (1989) supplemented the account with diagrams 
showing the brakes in the on and off position. He also used a block diagram to depict the 
nitrogen cycle, the continuous flow of atmospheric nitrogen through animals, plants and 
the soil and back to the air. The effect was to improve conceptual recall by as much as 
144 per cent. Creative problem solving was improved by as much as 460 per cent. Mayer 
saw good organizers as those which guide attention to what matters, highlighting internal 
relationships in the information and helping the learner construct external connections 
with existing knowledge. Flow and other processes and attributes, however, may have to 
be represented by pictorial metaphors, such as arrows, whiz lines, jagged and wavy lines. 
Care is needed, especially with younger learners, as these are not always understood as 
intended and some graphics, such as graphs and maps, can themselves present difficulties 
(Newton, D. 1985, Gerber et al. 1995). Nevertheless, teachers are well-placed to 
construct and try organizers to suit specific situations for themselves. 
 
Having learners construct their own depictions of relationships has also been found to 
support understanding (Edens and Potter 2001), even with very young children (Scripp 
2000). Constructing a concept or mind map to bring together and relate ideas in various 
ways has a similar effect (Mintzes et al. 1997, Bolte 2006). For instance, ‘Recycling’ may 
appear at the centre of a page, surrounded and connected to associated concepts, such as, 
‘Environmental’ and ‘Resources’. Each of these, in turn, may have ideas connected to it, 
in this way forming a web or network of related ideas. There are various versions of such 
representations. For example, Bulgren and Scanlon (1998) describe a ‘concept diagram’ 
for Settlers. There is a space for the learner to list key words, a space for the central 
concept (Settlers) and for the superordinate concept (People), lines for the attributes 
shared by all settlers, lines for those shared by some, and lines for those never present. 
Areas are set aside for the listing of specific examples, tied to the attributes, and for a 
definition of the term Settler. The student’s task is to supply the information. Roth (1997) 
reminds us of the use of flowcharts, rather like cartoon strips, to sequence procedures. 
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Boyle and Yeager’s study guides for whole topics provide a more extensive framework to 
support learning. They comprise the objectives, the reading that has to be done, key 
words, a list of activities, and some guidance on self-assessment. Story maps, on the other 
hand, are rather like concept maps which connect the setting (characters, time and place), 
problem, goal, action, and resolution. Such maps could be applied in other areas to 
connect important events, main ideas, other significant ideas and the outcome (Boyle and 
Yeager 1997). The long-term aim is for students to construct graphic organizers 
themselves but some may be so cumbersome or limited in use that students are unlikely to 
use them unprompted. 
 
The philosopher, Ludvig Wittgenstein, talked of the mediated mind in which thought and 
someone’s verbal expression of it are mutually reinforcing (Wittgenstein 1958, Nyíri 
2005). Graphical organizers are able to extend thought outside the head in a similar way 
so that an understanding may be constructed or improved as the representation is 
constructed. They can also help the learner make connections by guiding attention to what 
is relevant. Some of the mental burden may be reduced as every detail need no longer be 
held in working memory. 
 
Representations of concepts, patterns and relationships can, of course, involve more than 
pictures. They can be found in any subject and appear frequently in mathematics, science 
and technology. An iceberg model has been used to describe the way students’ 
understanding of formal notations in mathematics (e.g. ¾) needs to rest on a large amount 
of experience with other representations (such as three quadrants of an apple and three 
out of four coins of the same denomination) (Webb et al. 2008). Representations can be 
quite concrete and tied to familiar experience. Resting on these may be structures 
designed to help learners grasp an operation and work with it. Harries et al. (2008), for 
instance, have designed an array of discs to illustrate fundamental properties of 
multiplication and show the process on a computer screen (see also Harries and Barmby 
2007). These underlying representations are, ultimately, determined by the teacher. 
Chemistry, on the other hand, rests on a mastery of three particular kinds of 
representation: the macro (the properties of substances), the sub-micro (the behaviour of 
the basic particles in substances), and the symbolic (involving precise relationships in 
chemical changes) (Gilbert and Treagust 2009). At times, the sub-micro representation is 
presented as a three-dimensional model. In technology, a tangible model can be useful in 
problem solving both in supporting an understanding of the problem and in producing 
tentative solutions. Nevertheless, do not expect young children to model problems or 
potential solutions unprompted; they need to learn how to do it and find that the activity 
has value (Newton, D. 2005). In science, although representations do widely support 
understanding, they need careful handling as they can be misinterpreted (Chandrasegaran 
et al. 2009, Ainsworth 2008). In mathematics, many recommend that formal notation 
should rest on multiple representations, some drawn from everyday life, if it is to have 
meaning. Some representations in mathematics, however, are not self-evident (Nunes 
1993). The meaning and use of a number line or a multiplication array, for instance, needs 
to be taught and practised and can still be difficult to grasp for some learners (Harries and 
Barmby 2007). Harries and Barmby point to the need for consistency and transparency in 
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how a representation is used so that learners can grasp its meaning. Brenner et al. (1997) 
showed the value of having learners represent a problem in several different ways (words, 
tables, graphs and symbols) before attempting its solution.  
 
 
Analogies 
 
An analogy draws parallels between what is to be understood and something familiar 
which looks or behaves similarly. For example, in electronics, certain components behave 
like gates that open when the conditions are right.  Real gates are what we find in gardens 
and fields, not computers. They come from a different domain to the world of electronics 
but, nevertheless, the parallels can help us understand the function of certain electronic 
components. The gate is an analogous structure or an analogy for the component. 
Similarly, a narrow beam of light reflects off a mirror something like a ball bouncing off 
a wall. Ball-bouncing belongs to a different domain to light-reflecting but its action 
parallels that of light enough to make it useful in explaining reflection from a mirror. 
Someone who grasps these parallels has a potentially useful mental representation.    
 
An analogy is intended to support the process of reasoning by using a parallel situation. 
Because it resembles or behaves like what is to be learned in some way, it offers a mental 
model to think with (Gentner 1998), allowing knowledge in one domain to be used in 
another. In effect, it bridges the gap between the known and the unknown (Halpern et al. 
1990). For instance:  
 
 in psychology the telephone exchange was once a common analogy used to explain the 
functions of the brain. Nowadays, it is not uncommon for the computer to have that 
role; 
 in biology, the baking of a cake has been an analogy for photosynthesis;  
 in archaeology, the process of excavation has been likened to eating a trifle – it is 
destructive; 
 in literature, Tolstoy’s War and Peace compared the French Army to a herd of cattle 
trampling the fodder that might have saved it from starvation; 
 in language, the pronunciation and inflexion of parts of speech often takes the form of 
similar, known words; we notice this particularly in young children – ‘I didded it’ – 
but it is not confined to them;  
 in environmental studies, the Earth may be compared to Easter Island where 
overpopulation and exploitation led to societal collapse; 
  analogies themselves have been described as families of resemblances. 
 
Thinking and communicating through parallels is something we do readily (Goswami 
1992). Metaphors serve a similar purpose in enabling us to think of one thing in terms of 
something else. For instance, we might describe the skeleton of a building, feet like lead, 
or feeling woolly-headed. Literary devices like these catch attention and make a point. As 
Samuel Johnson (1709–1784) put it, metaphor and simile give you two ideas for one and 
convey meaning with a perception of delight.  
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At the same time, analogies are not always appropriate. For example, Campbell (1990) 
has questioned the use of oral language as an analogy for the acquisition of written 
language skills. Similarly, Thomas (1991) urges caution in drawing analogies between art 
in different domains, as between a play and a painting. 
 
 
The effect of analogies 
 
Analogies work because they facilitate the transfer of relationships from the known to the 
unknown (Halpern et al. 1990), as in Figure 6.1. This looks like a mentally demanding 
task and Piagetian psychologists considered reasoning by analogy to develop after about 
11 or 12 years of age, when there was some facility with formal operations and 
correlational reasoning (Zeitoun 1984). Consequently, analogies have tended to be 
ignored as support for younger children’s thinking. Goswami (1992), however, 
demonstrated that younger children are capable of analogical reasoning.  For instance, 
children were shown pictures of a ball of playdoh before and after it was cut. Another 
picture showed an apple. Children readily reasoned analogically and, from pictures of a 
cut cake, a bruised apple, a ball, a banana and a cut apple, chose the cut apple as the 
matching one for the playdoh. 
 
<<approximate postion of Figure 6.1>> 
 
Goswami found that primary school children could cope with such tasks provided that 
they know what is expected of them and they understand the basis of the analogy. 
Problems can stem from a lack of knowledge of the analogical base and relationships 
with the target. Bearing in mind that analogical reasoning is bridging between known and 
unknown, this is not unreasonable. There can be no analogical reasoning if the analogical 
model is not known.  
 
Hatano and Inagaki (1994) observed 5-year-olds using the needs of people as an analogy 
for the needs of plants. The reasoning went something like this. Plants have to be 
watered. Why? People need water; plants need water; they have to have a regular drink 
just as people do. Why do plants die if you give them too much water?  If people were to 
drink too much, they would be ill, fall down and die. It is the same with plants. Similarly, 
they found 6-year-olds were able to explain a squirrel’s sickness, weakness and the 
effects of old age by analogy with people. Gelman and Markman (1987) noted simple 
analogical reasoning as early as 3 and 4 years of age. Young children can also generate 
their own parallels. For example, one 6-year-old was able to depict the tune of ‘Row, 
Row, Row Your Boat’ using spaced lines of different lengths to represent phrase 
structure, rhythm and pitch (Davidson and Scripp 1992). 
 
The key to success is that what will serve as the analogical model is well-known to the 
learner. The limited experience of young children means that there may be only a small 
pot of knowledge to draw on. However, the difficulty may be overcome by ensuring that 
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the requisite knowledge is present. Newton, D. and Newton, L. (1995) showed that 
spending a few minutes raising 6-year-olds’ awareness of the flow of water when pumped 
through a tube by a soap dispenser makes it possible to use this as an effective analogy for 
teaching about simple electrical circuits (Figure 6.2).  
 
<<approximate position of Figure 6.2>> 
 
Subsequent tests showed that the children could use this analogy to explain what 
happened in other electrical circuits. One child described the parallels in the following 
terms: 
 
Child:  It’s [electricity’s] just ... kind of ... a bit like water. It’s just going round 
and into the bulb. 
Investigator: What?  The electricity’s like water? 
Child: Yes. 
Investigator: How’s the electricity like water? 
Child: Because, with the pump, you press that and the water goes round but that 
goes back to the bottle ... Like, say that was the light bulb and this was the battery. 
Press that ... Right? And it would go all into the battery. 
 
When faced with a circuit which had two opposing batteries and a bulb that did not come 
on, he was spontaneously able to explain it in terms of two soap dispensers and the 
opposing flows they were trying to induce. 
 
Analogies have also been used to develop young children’s vocabulary in a variety of 
subjects. Greenwood (1988) has pointed out that learning a list of words is a 
decontextualized task which risks acquired only vague meanings. Analogy exercises, on 
the other hand, provide a context and require the learner to engage mentally with the 
meaning.  For example, book is to read as television is to ... provides a context to explore 
a variety of words of like meaning (HuffBenkoski and Greenwood 1995). In music, 
inexperienced learners often lack a vocabulary for describing musical experience. Once 
again, analogy can help. For example, it might be spatial, as in using up and down to 
describe changes in pitch, or figure and ground to distinguish a musical element from its 
context (Froehlich and Cattley 1991, Stollack and Alexander 1998). 
 
Analogies are not always effective, as when the topic is readily understood without 
support or when the analogy is a bad one. Analogies may also be ineffective when the 
learner does not grasp the analogy or see it as relevant or simply does not use it. For 
example, Gilbert (1989) found little evidence of support when using an analogy in 
biology units for 14 and 15-year-olds. His analogy for a foetus being sustained in the 
womb was an electrical appliance plugged into a socket in the wall. The placenta was 
described as being like the wall and socket and the umbilical cord as being like the 
electrical cable. Just as electrical current flows from the socket to the appliance, so food 
and minerals flowed to the foetus. However, his analogy may not have been necessary, it 
may not be have been good enough, or may be rendered worthless by the instructional 
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demand it added to the task. In this instance, it seems likely to have been the first of these, 
the topic was readily grasped without it. 
 
 
Kinds of analogy 
 
Analogies may be classified in a variety of ways. For example, Thiele and Treagust 
(1994) classified them as simple, enriched or extended. Simple analogies were those 
which were statements without elaboration (for example, the spinal cord is like a cable). 
Enriched analogies included the grounds for the analogy (for example, wind carrying sand 
acts like a sandblasting machine; sandblasting machines blow sand at stonework to wear 
away the dirty surface). Extended analogies apply to several topics (for example, atoms as 
billiard balls occur in several topics in several sciences). 
 
Curtis and Reigeluth (1984) classified analogies into those that are structural, those that 
are functional and those that are both structural and functional. With structural analogies, 
parallels are drawn between appearances, physical organizations, or structures (for 
example, the Earth is like an orange; both appear roughly spherical with a slightly 
roughened surface and both have ‘skins’). With functional analogies, parallels are drawn 
with the way something operates, behaves or functions (for example, the brain is like a 
compute; both have means of encoding incoming information, processing and storing it). 
Some analogies have both properties (for example, the soap dispenser and tube analogy 
for an electrical circuit can resemble and behave like some aspects of a simple electrical 
circuit; the dispenser can look a little like a battery, the tube outwardly resembles a wire 
and water circulates through the dispenser and tube as an electrical current does through a 
battery and wire). Curtis and Reigeluth considered this kind of analogy to be particularly 
effective. It is easy to match the components and that makes it easier to see parallels in 
the way they function. 
 
The point is that one analogy can have a very different form from another and serve a 
different function. There is no reason to expect them to be equally effective in these 
functions and it is useful to know that functional analogies are potentially effective. At 
the same time, enriched analogies are likely to be more effective than simple analogies 
with younger children because the grounds for the analogy are made explicit. 
 
 
Analogy and understanding 
 
What is to be understood is often referred to as the target. The parallel situation which is 
to help understand the target is the analogue. Analogical mapping between target and 
analogue is performed to construct the analogy (Duit 1991). Consider what Curtis and 
Reigeluth called a structural analogy, such as an orange for the shape of the Earth. The 
intention is to support the understanding of appearance, organization or structure. The 
Earth is the target (T) and the orange is the analogue (A). Structural features can be 
mapped between the two: 
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 T1: The Earth is roughly spherical; 
 A1: The orange is roughly spherical. 
 
 T2: The surface of the Earth is uneven but this is insignificant on the          
larger scale; 
 A2: The surface of the orange is uneven but this is insignificant on the          
larger scale. 
 
 T3: The Earth has a crust; 
 A3: The orange has a skin. 
 
Because we tend to view the Earth from a local perspective, its spherical nature, the 
insignificance of its mountains and valleys, and the existence of an outer layer can be 
difficult to grasp. On the scale of an orange, it is easier. As far as these features are 
concerned, the orange provides a familiar model. The familiarity makes processing less 
demanding. At the same time, the model provides a mental structure which allows the 
relevant relationships to be readily inferred. The pores on its skin visibly and palpably do 
not present major interruptions to the surface so, on the same scale, the Earth’s mountains 
and valleys could be no more significant. In effect, thinking is easier because the orange 
domain is more familiar and the relationships easier to understand in it.  
 
In the case of a functional relationship, the function or behaviour of the target is modelled 
by the analogue. The computer as a model for the brain is an example. The brain does not 
look like the computer and may not be organized like it, nevertheless, they have some 
functions in common:   
 
 T1: encodes information from the senses for processing; 
 A1: encodes incoming data for processing; 
 
 T2: holds and processes information in working memory; 
 A2: holds and processes data in random access memory (RAM); 
 
 T3: stores information for later recall in long term memory; 
 A4: stores information for later recall on a hard disc drive; 
 
 T4: communicates outcomes of processing (e.g. by speech or writing); 
 A4: communicates outcomes of processing (e.g. by screen or printer). 
 
On the assumption that the learner is familiar with the computer, these functional 
parallels provide a mental structure for the brain and allow some reasoning about the 
brain to take place with it. Thus, it is possible to exceed the RAM capacity of a computer 
so we can speculate about the same possibility with the working memory model.  
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Another functional example is when the target begins in one state and ends in another and 
the analogue models the change. One difficulty in understanding an event of this kind is 
in connecting one state with another. An analogy can help by providing an alternative, 
more familiar path between mental states drawing on known relationships (Figure 6.3). 
The situation has to be mentally represented but, instead of attempting to bridge from this 
to some subsequent state, it is mapped onto another representation (often recalled from 
memory). This other representation is then articulated according to familiar ‘rules’ to 
produce a subsequent state. This subsequent state is then translated into the target’s 
subsequent state (Halford 1993).  
 
For example, a ray of light changes direction when it travels from air into a block of glass 
(Figure 6.3). An analogy may be made with a pair of wheels on an axle which run into 
sand. The reason that the ray of light changes direction can be quite difficult to grasp. 
But, the reason for the wheels changing direction involves familiar concepts and 
experience. One wheel (X) enters the sand before the other. The drag of the sand slows it 
down but the other wheel is still off the sand and is going faster. This makes the axle slew 
around and travel in a different direction, much like the ray of light does. A significant 
amount of research relates to the use of analogy in supporting understanding of the 
natural and physical world and for those with a particular interest in this Duit (1991) and 
Duit and Glynn (1996) provide useful accounts. 
 
<<Approximate position of Figure 6.3>> 
 
It seems that the retrieval of the basis of an analogy it is not spontaneous, even in adults. 
When structures and functions of a target are modelled by an analogue, the two may be 
connected in many ways in a learner’s memory. This probably increases the likelihood 
that the target will stimulate a recall of the analogue. It also makes the analogy potentially 
more powerful since there are more relationships to draw on (Suzuki 1994). There is, 
however, more to it than that. For instance, in the case of the flow of electricity, it is the 
correspondence with the flow of water that stimulates retrieval. Terms with related 
meanings may play a significant part in the retrieval process (Thagard 1992). In mapping, 
the structure of some existing knowledge is mapped onto the new or less understood 
target (Gentner 1989). When it comes to mapping, it is the existence of material 
correspondences and similar configurations that matter. In the electricity-water flow 
analogy, wires and tubes carrying the flow would be an instance. 
 
In long explanations, analogies are more effective if presented at the outset (Halpern et al. 
1990). Here, they can serve as an advance organizer, giving the student a mental 
framework to think with and fostering the construction of an appropriate mental 
representation. This is, of course, what Ausubel’s (1968) comparative advance organizer 
does. It ensures that there is a sound basis to think from at the beginning of the 
instruction.  
 
Halpern et al. (1990) also compared the relative merits of near and far analogies. Near 
and far analogies are drawn from similar and different domains, respectively. For 
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example, in an account of the lymph system, they used the movement of water through a 
sponge as the far domain analogy and the movement of blood through veins as the near 
domain analogy. The far analogies were more effective in promoting understanding, 
possibly because they are very unlike the topic under study so attract attention and tend to 
be recalled more readily. However, being distant, parallels may not be clear and the 
student may need to dwell on them to a greater degree.  
 
Learners may, of course, generate their own analogies. The conditions for success are not 
necessarily like those for the analogy that is given. Wong (1993) found that students 
(adults in this case) can generate analogies when attempting to understand phenomena 
such as the behaviour of air in a bicycle pump. Analogy-making like this can to add 
coherence and meaning and can help to develop understanding further. This makes the 
self-generated analogy a potentially device for supporting understanding but it assumes 
that the learner has some idea about what an analogy is. It also opens the possibility that 
inappropriate or weak analogies will be generated so that understanding may actually be 
hindered. When this is likely, it is important to discuss students’ analogies as they 
generate them (Thagard 1992). 
 
Bridging analogies 
When some action or event is difficult to understand or when misconceptions lead to 
understanding failure, Clement (1993) has found bridging analogies to be helpful. For 
instance, he found students had difficulty accepting that a book on a table experiences an 
upward force from the table (called the reaction of the table). He constructed a chain of 
experiences intended to bridge from the known to the unknown (Figure 6.4).  
 
<<Approximate position of Figure 6.4>> 
 
To begin with, the student pushes down on the spring and can feel its response pushing 
up. This is repeated with a hand on a sponge, then a book replaces the hand and produces 
the same effect. There is an obvious effect on the hand from the spring. Although less, the 
effect from the sponge is still noticeable. Since the book depresses the sponge in the same 
way, it is reasonable to believe that there is an upward push on the book like that 
experienced by the hand. The book is now placed on a ‘table’ made from thin board. The 
‘table’ is distorted just like the sponge. Again, it is reasonable to believe that there is an 
upward force on the book as there was when it was on the sponge. Finally, the book is 
placed on a real table. Although the depression is not noticeable, it can be made so by 
reflecting light from a mirror on its surface and watching the reflection as the book is 
placed on it. Since the real table is also depressed, it is again reasonable to believe that 
there is an upward force on the book. 
 
The hand on the spring, sponge and thin board ‘table’ provide the analogies for the book 
on the real table. The sensation of a hand pushing down on the spring, sponge and thin 
board may not be in prior experience or may not be available for reflection. Providing the 
experience ensures that it is available and is in a useful context. At the same time, a 
feeling of the upward force is likely to be more directly meaningful than using a force 
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meter as an intermediary that requires interpretation. The problem is that, as with bridging 
explanations, bridging analogies can be difficult to construct for some topics. Most will 
have to be collected or compiled before teaching and, as they are topic specific, they will 
form a part of a teacher’s subject-specific, pedagogical knowledge. 
 
 
Using analogies to change perspectives 
 
Having a particular view of the world shapes the relationships we are likely to infer. In 
this sense, understanding is perspective-bound (e.g. Wolpert 1992). Changing the 
perspective can enable new understandings. For instance, in 1615, William Harvey saw 
the heart in terms of a bellows-like water pump. This new perspective generated a new 
way of looking at the function of the heart and its vessels, namely, as a circulatory system 
(Sutton 1996). Students often need to adopt another or a particular perspective when 
approaching a topic in order to understand in the way that subject specialists do. Sutton 
argues persuasively that perspectives stem from the language, metaphors and analogies of 
a subject and novices need to assimilate them. In this way, other relationships are enabled 
through a changed perspective.  
 
This is an important idea. The analogy can reduce processing load but, here, its primary 
function is as a provider of a new perspective. This perspective-changing role of analogy 
could play a significant part in enabling particular or authorized understandings in some 
subjects. Such analogies often stem from the person responsible for the particular 
perspective in the first place or from their apologists or popularizers. Darwin’s Tree of 
Life analogy for evolutionary relationships amongst species is an instance. Rouvray 
(1994) describes the very important role of analogies in the development and progress of 
science. In particular, he mentions the billiard balls in a box analogy for a gas, beads on a 
string for polymer molecules, and the solar system for the atom. In such cases, the 
analogy may not be familiar to the student and would have to be developed through talk 
and experience. In other cases, metaphors and analogies become a mundane part of 
speech and lose their referent power, allusion and meaning. As such, they cease to 
support in the way they once did. Sutton (1996) feels that understanding is, in part, 
coming to know this analogical language as it was intended. 
 
Limitations of support from analogies 
Supporting understanding with analogies is not without its difficulties. One of these is 
when the learner does not know the analogical situation well enough to make it 
immediately useful. A solution is to teach it thoroughly before using it. The less 
experienced the learner, the more likely this course of action will be needed. In general, it 
could be good practice to check existing knowledge, if only to bring it to consciousness 
ready for use. 
 
Analogies are also not without shortcomings. The main one is that no analogy is a perfect 
match for the target knowledge. This means that there is a danger that an analogy will be 
over-extended and inappropriate aspects will be given to the target. In the electricity-
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water analogy, when the tube is cut, water runs out. It would not be appropriate to transfer 
this to the electrical circuit: electricity does not flow from a cut wire. One approach to the 
danger of over-extension is to make limitations explicit (Heywood and Parker 1997). 
 
There is also an order effect which may block alternative interpretations of events (Keane 
1997). An example is when someone learns British history before American history. This 
tends to make British history the source of models for American history, rather than the 
other way around. Keane describes the way politicians use the order effect to their 
advantage. By drawing an analogy between the drug problem and fighting a war, for 
instance, people tend to think of solutions based on police action and penal legislation 
rather than alternatives, perhaps based on an ‘illness-of-society’ analogy. 
 
Analogies are, of course symmetrical: water flow in pipes could be an analogy for 
electrical current flow and electrical current flow could be a model for water flow in 
pipes. In practice, the one generally found to be difficult to understand tends to be the 
target. However, a good analogy is not available until its source is known to the learner. 
This means there may need to be some long term planning to develop a source before the 
target arises. 
 
Preparing to offer an analogy 
Generally, Treagust et al. (1992) found that analogy use in teaching tends not to be pre-
planned but is a response to non-verbal cues. Analogies in lessons were rare and not used 
to their best effect. Curtis and Reigeluth (1984) analysed North American science 
textbooks and found them to be relatively rare (8.3 analogies per book). Newton, L. 
(2003) came to a similar conclusion for primary science textbooks in the U.K. The 
incidence of analogies can also vary enormously within and between subjects. For 
instance, Curtis (1988) found that there were about three times as many analogies in 
science texts as in social studies in the U.S.A. On the basis of what has been discussed, 
some more or less self-evident steps for teaching with analogy can be offered: 
 
1. Check the student’s prior knowledge of the topic to determine if support for 
understanding is needed.  
2. If the topic is demanding, look for a stock analogy in books and by asking colleagues.  
3. If one is not available, construct an analogy, preferably based on something known to 
the learner. This may not be easy but can be rewarding.  
4. If the analogy is not well known, provide experience of it before using it. 
5. Introduce the analogy early in the teaching.  
6. Exemplify its application.  
7. Identify its limits.  
8. Provide practice in using the analogy. 
 
 
Summary 
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The aim of these supporting devices is to help people see what matters, notice 
relationships, build their own internal, mental representations and think productively with 
them. They have a variety of shapes and sizes, including an enactive gesture, a pictorial 
depiction, an artefact, a computer micro-world and an analogy. Each more or less 
represents what we want someone to grasp. Analogies support understanding because 
they enable reasoning about something relatively unknown through something generally 
well-known. The links between some representations and what is to be understood are not 
necessarily evident to a learner and may have to be taught. The limitations of such 
representations need to be made explicit. In the next chapter, various ways of supporting 
understanding are brought together and illustrated in the context of the surrogate teacher. 
 
 
Afterthought 
 
Students have been described as customers. After all, students in higher education and 
elsewhere often pay for their education. How might such an analogy with commerce 
shape notions of teaching and learning? 
 
 
 
 
 
